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Modernization theory has rightly become a central topic of twentieth-century U.S. 
intellectual history.
1
  Not only does it represent a key movement in modern economics, but 
modernization theory’s purposeful interdisciplinarity ropes in psychology, sociology and 
political science (at least), and makes it stand as one of the main pillars of the new 
interdiscipline of behavioral science that was so influential in the postwar Western academy.  
As an equally purposeful policy science, modernization theory also played an important role 
in a raft of postwar political initiatives – in the Cold War, in international economic 
development, in the organization of science, in counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War.  
This unusually fruitful (albeit often unusually destructive) intermeshing of ideas and politics 
has been neatly exemplified in the person of Walt Rostow, “America’s Rasputin”, who 
parlayed a politically unpromising track record as an economic historian into a role as one of 
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the principal strategists of the Vietnam War.
2
  Opinion differs as to how determinative 
modernization theory’s ideas were;  Bruce Kuklick has suggested of most social science in 
this period that it “served to legitimate but not to energize politics”;  or, as a participant put it 
more trenchantly in 1949, “The administrator uses social science the way a drunk uses a 
lamppost, for support rather than for illumination.”3  Still, most intellectual historians would 
be happy (though not necessarily proud) to think that their key concepts provided even 
support for the major political enterprises of their day. 
Modernization theory should probably be considered as only one, highly discrete 
phase in the broader history of developmentalism, that is, the idea that economic 
development is the highest (in some variants the only) goal of politics.  Though clearly 
economic development as a goal of government can be traced back at least as far as 
mercantilism and cameralism, until the nineteenth century it had to compete with religion and 
liberty, and really only came into its pomp when religion began to fade as a central concern 
of government towards the end of the nineteenth century;  it is no coincidence that many 
social scientists were the children of clergy and missionaries.  Competing variants of 
developmentalism that have also received their due in recent intellectual historiography 





especially, the rise of neoliberalism
6
, which can claim some of the same hegemony over 
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public policy since the 1980s that modernization theory claimed for the 1950s and 1960s, and 
indeed shared some of the same intellectual roots in the interwar period. 
What makes the modernization-theory variant of developmentalism so distinctive?  
Nils Gilman and Michael Latham have drawn out a number of connected strands:  its 
optimism about the applicability of Western (particularly American) growth models to the 
whole world, including the least developed economies;  its interdisciplinarity, locating the 
sources or nemeses of growth at the same time in institutional structures, personality types, 
social structures, and social values and attitudes;  and its congruence with American Cold 
War liberalism, which gestated it in the 1950s, brought it briefly to power in the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations, and then declined with it in the 1970s.  Gilman goes so far as to 
call it “a high-concept version of Americanism:  materialism without class conflict, 
secularism without irreverence, democracy without disobedience”.7  Both Gilman and 
Latham also helpfully teased out sub-variants within the modernization-theory variant, 
differentiating not only among the psychological, economic, sociological and political 
approaches, but also between harder and softer approaches, depending on whether 
modernization was seen as a natural and inevitable, historically implied, or artificial, activist 
process.  Gilman in particular majored on the “darker” variant associated with Gabriel 
Almond and Lucian Pye, who dwelt upon the obstacles to modernization and thus advocated 
a more interventionist policy in dealing with less-developed economies, what one early 
modernizer called “hitting the solar plexus” of a pre-modern society, “necessary to make 
large changes in an antiquated social structure by striking at its key points”.8 
Now, a decade later, at about the same time as neoliberalism has moved onto the 
intellectual-history stage, we are also experiencing a second-wave of modernization-theory 
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texts, in which the sub-variants themselves are tested and modernization theory’s critics and 
bystanders are introduced.
9
  Daniel Immerwahr’s Thinking Small deliberately inverts the 
primacy of modernization theory in the mid-twentieth century by rehabilitating a parallel 
tradition of “small-group” thinking and communitarian ideology.  To uncover this tradition, 
Immerwahr argues, it is necessary first to identify and deconstruct the unilinear narrative of 
modernity that we have inherited from modernization theory itself and, before it, from the 
developmentalist granddaddies of modern social theory, Marx, Durkheim and Weber.
10
  He 
calls this narrative “Modernization Comes to Town”, the nearly ubiquitous story of “how a 
world that was once rooted in local, heterogeneous, informal, flexible, pluralistic, and, above 
all, small-scale institutions was lost”.11  “Loss” is a keyword here, because thinking about 
community as a thing of the past allows one to have one’s cake and eat it too – to enjoy the 
fruits of modernity and to wax elegiac about “the world we have lost”.12  So “Modernization 
Comes to Town” is a story told by critics of modernization as well as, with Schadenfreude, its 
celebrants.   
Immerwahr points instead to the persistence of the “local, heterogeneous, informal, 
flexible, pluralistic, and, above all, small-scale” idea of community even in the strongholds of 
modernization theory, that is, academia and development policy.  Communitarianism’s ace-
in-the-hole was America’s enduring love affair with small-town life, and even, at a stretch, 
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with the peasant, construed as the family farmer.  Immerwahr argues that this love affair 
reached something of a peak in the 1930s, in the heyday of Norman Rockwell and Thornton 
Wilder and Frank Capra, and in the New Deal’s obsession with rural development, which 
gave community development its first policy foothold in the Department of Agriculture’s 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics.  One beneficiary of this romance, and in some ways the 
hero of Immerwahr’s book, was the anthropologist Robert Redfield, who worked for a time 
as a consultant for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and whose fieldwork among 
peasants in Mexico (published as Tepoztlan, 1931, and Chan Kom, 1934) showed Americans 
– and development officials – how the romance of the small farmer could be seen also 
playing itself out in the most unlikely places in the developing world.  Redfield, who as 
Immerwahr observes is sometimes seen as one of the first modernization theorists, was in 
truth a keen-eyed observer of modernization processes but an advocate for peasant 
communities able to preserve their “little traditions” within those processes – a not 
uncommon blend of roles amongst anthropologists of the day.
13
 
A similarly subtle embedding of community consciousness within modernization 
processes is evident when Immerwahr turns to the place of community development within 
Cold War development programs.  Needless to say, India had an even stronger romance with 
the small farmer than New Deal America, and Immerwahr argues that this indigenous 
romance was put to good use by American development planners in India such as Ellery 
Foster (another veteran of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics) and Albert Mayer (who cut 
his teeth on planning “Green Belt” towns in the New Deal).  In this account, Nehru appears 
not as the betrayer, the apostle of Western-style modernization, as he has often been 
portrayed, but rather as the true heir of Gandhi.  It is only with Nehru’s death in 1964, and the 
succession of his daughter, Indira Gandhi, in 1966, that the pendulum swings back to 
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modernization pur sang (uncoincidentally at modernization theory’s highpoint of influence in 
Washington), given a savage twist by Gandhi’s personal authoritarianism.   
A less benign embedding of community consciousness within modernization 
processes is displayed in the unlikely figure of Colonel Edward Lansdale, perhaps the model 
for Eugene Burdick and William Lederer’s Ugly American (1958), outed as the architect of 
American counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines and Vietnam by Neil Sheehan in his 
classic A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (1988), and 
subsequently a linchpin in many books on the connections between modernization theory, 
counterinsurgency and American foreign policy.  To Immerwahr, however, Lansdale’s 
promotion of a community-development strategy in the Philippines looks more like Mayer’s 
program in India.
14
  It is at this point that doubts may arise about the excessive elasticity of 
Immerwahr’s concept of the small group or community, which can serve as readily as 
modernization theory’s most effective tool as its nemesis.   
There are, after all, small groups and small groups.  There are the small groups that 
are distinctive cultures, true communities, and which advocates like Redfield sought to 
defend against the monoculture of modernization.  And there are the small groups that 
modernization theorists assemble in laboratories to test theories about allegedly universal 
human traits.  These could be randomly selected or artificially constituted groups, such as the 
squads of GIs dissected by the famous sociological study of The American Soldier (1949), 
which derived a range of ideas crucial to postwar behavioral science and thus to 
modernization theory, such as the “primary group”, the “frame of reference”, and the concept  
of “relative deprivation”.15  Immerwahr scoops such studies into his ambit, as if they were all 
in some way defending existing communities in the way that Redfield was, rather than 
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studying existing communities (or constituting artificial ones), the better to derive universal 
principles of human action in groups for modernizing purposes.
16
  It’s not that Immerwahr is 
unaware of the differences;  but as he slips from one to the other, it is sometimes difficult to 
gauge what politics (or indeed what ideas of nature and culture) are in play at any particular 
time.  And in pursuing the idea of “community development without modernization” he tends 
to downplay the equally powerful idea of “community development for modernization”.17  
When, for example, he recounts an apparently comic encounter between his community 
developers and the barons of modernization theory at a MIT conference in 1957, he 
concludes that the latter simply couldn’t understand the former.  To the contrary, I would 
argue, they had a very precise understanding of the value of community development;  and 
indeed, Immerwahr quotes Lucian Pye’s view at this meeting that community development 
was a technique for creating “a modern nation – in which secular and industrialized modes of 
behavior will be secure and dominant – out of an earthbound society, predominantly 
composed of a population that is fragmented into tightly ordered village units”.18 
Immerwahr might have spelled out these tensions more clearly from the beginning, 
and tracked more explicitly the points at which “community development” declares itself 
modernization’s nemesis, or at which it becomes modernization’s most potent tool, and, most 
interestingly, the points in between where strange bedfellows acted together simultaneously 
on both premises.  But to have done so would also have spoiled some of the apparent ironies 
upon which Immerwahr relies for narrative drive.  Modernization theorists captured both the 
Indian and the Philippine community-development programs, not so much by twist of fate or 
sleight of hand, as it appears in Immerwahr’s suspenseful narrative, but because they had 
always also been interested in small-group dynamics, for very different reasons.   Depending 
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on your outlook, the Indian village could be seen as a laboratory for grassroots participation 
by the poor, or as an instrument of central economic policy in which local landlords and 
officials played all the key roles.  Even more clearly, in the Philippines, Lansdale and his 
allies always saw the village as an instrument for a policy determined elsewhere – an anti-
Communist as well as a modernization policy.  In a social-engineering vein very reminiscent 
of The American Soldier, the principal community-development agency in the Philippines 
adopted a “therapeutic approach to rural problems” aimed at harnessing grassroots labour to 
elite projects.
19
  No wonder that Walt Rostow praised programs like Lansdale’s as “a mixture 
of attractive political and economic programs in the underdeveloped areas and a ruthless 
projection to the peasantry that the central government intends to be the wave of the future”.20  
Even Redfield, as we have seen, could be mistaken for a modernization theorist himself – not 
without some shreds of reason.
21
  As Immerwahr acknowledges, Redfield himself fudged the 
distinction by gravitating towards those peasant communities like Chan Kom whose cultures 
were happily congruent with modern values:  “These villagers had much of the Protestant 
ethic before they had ever heard of Protestantism.”22 
In Immerwahr’s handling, this central ambiguity in the mission of community 
development comes back to bite policymakers when it is brought home in the 1960s, in the 
form of War on Poverty programs such as VISTA and especially the programs launched from 
Sargent Shriver’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).  These programs were not on the 
whole designed by the community-development specialists, though Immerwahr shows 
connections to them through the important agency of Oscar Lewis, yet another veteran of the 
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Bureau of Agricultural Economics and a student of Redfield’s Tepoztlan, who invented the 
idea of the “culture of poverty”.  These programs were, after all, mainly a product of the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and of Cold-War liberals like Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, who were however shocked by their outcomes.  Strategies that had appeared 
“safe” to modernizing liberals in India and the Philippines, where they could rely on local 
landlords and authoritarian states, turned explosive when they fell into the hands of ‘60s 
radicals – the “maximum feasible misunderstanding”, as Moynihan pungently put it, riffing 
on the fatal goal of “maximum feasible participation” which he blamed on the community-
development specialists.  Johnson’s solution was to pretend American cities were like Indian 
or Philippine ones, and to incorporate local officials (“a new class of Brahmins”, as 
Immerwahr nicely puts it);  his 1967 bill to reorganize the OEO would have put mayors on 
the board of every federally-funded community action agency, and Congress added yet 
another layer of state and local government supervision.  The goal was, precisely as Gilman 
describes the modernization vision, “participation without insubordination”.23  Its failure, so 
close to home, spelled the end of both community development and modernization theory – 
another indication that these two movements were Doppelgȁnger as much as they were 
antagonists. 
In concluding with some reflections on the revival of communitarianism since the 
1990s, Immerwahr regrets the “fog of amnesia surrounding the history of community 
development”:  development workers move about too much to develop long memories, they 
are often too overwhelmed by immediate practicalities to pause for historical reflection, and 
in any case the history has been dominated by modernization theory.
24
  Obviously he hopes 
that his own historical reflections may help to overcome this amnesia;  and if any 
historiography is likely to tell with policymakers, it ought to be this kind of book, short, 
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stylish, lucid and passionate.  But amnesia seems to me (and also, I think, to Immerwahr) 
generally too easy an opening for historians, too obvious a demand for our services.  In this 
case, community development was overwhelmed by the political and economic power of 
modernization, which annexed community development to itself rather than acknowledging it 
as critique or opposition. 
It’s not as if community-developers, and other, more potent voices, weren’t warning 
all along about the flaws in top-down modernization.  Immerwahr says that community 
development wasn’t “noisy” enough, but it may have been, rather, that the men in power 
weren’t listening, or didn’t need to listen.  Probably the most famous development theorist 
outside the modernization camp, Albert Hirschman, was voicing community-development 
concerns all along, pari passu with the ascendancy of modernization theory, at least from 
1952 when this young émigré economist turned away from early work on the reconstruction 
of the European economy to the concerns of the developing world, on a World Bank mission 
to Colombia.  It is curious that Immerwahr does not mention Hirschman once – a casualty of 
his book’s tightness and economy – as his outlook, though rooted in European social 
democracy and anti-fascism rather than the New Deal and the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, and in economics rather than anthropology, was strikingly similar.  Hirschman 
was not an out-and-out opponent of modernization theory, and to some extent his interest in 
community development was motivated by a desire to make modernization projects work.  
But his intellectual bent was wholly against the kind of central planning that modernization as 
much as Marxism embraced – the idea that economies, cultures, societies were so articulated 
that they even had a solar plexus, much less one that could be satisfactorily struck.  His 
skeptical rationalism, forged in the crucible of catastrophic authoritarianism he had witnessed 
on his journey out of Nazi Germany and in his wartime analyses of the European economy 
under fascism, predisposed him to petites idées, to “intermediate links”, to pluralistic 
11 
 
strategies, and to the ironies and unintended consequences of ideas that were too big and too 
clumsy for complex human societies.   
It also predisposed him to the close, empirical study of communities from the 
grassroots, where “observation from the ground up”, as Jeremy Adelman puts it in his 
sprawling biography of Hirschman, trumped “over-all, integrated development programs”.25  
Against the modernization thesis of “balanced growth” – growth achieved by means of a “big 
push” across all sectors – he counterposed a vision of “unbalanced growth”, that embraced 
sectoral, regional and local diversity, and anticipated creative outcomes from the resulting 
contradictions.   His method of study was based not on aggregated statistics and macro-
economic models but on incessant travel:  from this irrigation project in Peru to that paper 
mill in Pakistan to this branch railway line in Nigeria.  His books and reports were dominated 
not by soaring architecture but by case studies.  And he was more attached politically to the 
kind of democracy that distributed power – even at the cost of, or perhaps with the bonus of, 
uncoordinated growth – than to the authoritarian nationalists in the developing world whom 
the modernization theorists found essential to coordinating the “big push”.   
Hirschman did not (so far as one can tell from Adelman’s account) speak the language 
of “community” or have much to do directly with the community development movement 
described by Immerwahr – neither its overseas nor its domestic wing.26  But he was much 
better placed than the community developers to make their critique of modernization theory 
from within, because he was never identified as an outright oppositionist, was much 
employed by some of the principal agencies of modernization (the World Bank, RAND, the 
Ford Foundation), begged by them to evaluate their programs, and went out of his way to 
position himself in the mainstream – he abjured his preferred term “unbalanced growth” so as 
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not to be dismissed as only perverse.  Even so, his critiques often went unheard – a matter not 
of amnesia but of deafness, his audience not wanting or needing to hear.  Some of this 
deafness was structural:  Hirschman’s critique of central planning offered no practical 
solutions for central planners except delegation of their powers to locals;  for this reason, he 
was most effective when addressing Latin American authorities who were undergoing (sadly 
short-lived) exercises in decentralization, Colombia and Brazil in the early 1960s, Chile later 
in the decade.  But part of the deafness was willful.  Adelman describes the response of the 
World Bank to Hirschman’s major evaluation of their development work, Development 
Projects Observed (1967), as “ungenerous and churlish”.  It was more than that – as Adelman 
says on the next page, the World Bank was “unaccustomed to letting outsiders be anything 
more than beneficiaries or, when things went wrong, blameworthy”.27  They weren’t under 
any pressure to act otherwise.  They knew Hirschman had lessons to teach them – an internal 
account written a few years later granted that although Hirschman’s report “does not lend 
itself to use as a manual for the instruction of the would-be project appraisers. . .the insights it 
provides could be neglected by such appraisers only at considerable cost” – but such 
acknowledgements, Adelman says, came “too little, too late”.28 
Hirschman’s full life endowed him early on with an air of world-weariness, but even 
the most hopeful and energetic – and Hirschman was one of those – would have to be worn 
down by the persistence and scale of such sublime disregard.  No wonder he retreated 
increasingly into academia – ultimately into its most eremitical redoubt, the Institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton – and is now probably better known as a social theorist (the 
author of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and The Passions and the Interests) than as a development 
expert.  This narrative arc gives Adelman’s book a mournful, frustrated cast – one of the 
closing chapters is entitled “Disappointment” – although it would be impossible not to enjoy 
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such a dazzlingly interesting life nor (at least for me) to admire such a humane and fertile 
thinker.
29
  But the message for Immerwahr and for the fortunes of community development is 
clear.  As Immerwahr himself grants, “[m]odernizers had gravity on their side”.30  This is a 
pretty powerful concession.  It does not mean that we must take the modernization story for 
granted or at face value, but it does mean that we need to appreciate better the power that lay 
behind it.  Especially if, as Immerwahr hopes, the recovery of the community-development 
counter-narrative is to do some political work in the present, it’s not enough to tell its story.  
Gauging its inherent weaknesses and its adversaries’ strengths is just as important, and to do 
that probably requires more structural analyses equivalent to, if more sophisticated, than the 
Weberian framework that Immerwahr deems inadequate, and which he fleetingly seeks to 
supplement in his closing pages.  But at least, as Immerwahr very clearsightedly says on his 
last page, telling the communitarian story “is to give up on a fantasy, the fantasy that 
community is the great untried experiment of the industrial age”.31   
 
Peter Mandler 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge 
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